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Abstract. In order to effectively align corporate social responsibility (CSR) with the poverty reduction agenda, corporations
need to be more inclusive and collaborative with other actors. Cross-sector partnerships in the implementation of CSR have
been an emerging approach and practice, as promoted by public administration scholars. Key actors in the partnerships may
come from the government, civil society represented by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and corporations. However,
designing successful effective partnerships that are relevant to cross-sector dynamics and political contexts has been proven to
be particularly challenging, especially in emerging economies and new democracies, such as Indonesia. This paper provides
key characteristics of effective cross-sector partnerships that have been derived from an examination of three case studies in
Indonesia and Tanzania. They represent cross-sector partnerships with differing scope and depth. Throughout this paper, one
can observe and extract key characteristics of effective partnerships based on three case studies of which a model for each is
described. In particular, characteristics utilized for assessing the effectiveness of the models include ownership, alignment and
synchronization, accountability, reduced dependency, resource sharing, along with representation and legitimacy.
Keywords: corporate social responsibility, cross-sector partnership, poverty reduction
Abstrak. Agar tanggung jawab sosial dan lingkungan (TJSL) perusahaan semakin relevan dengan agenda pengurangan
kemiskinan, perusahaan perlu lebih inklusif dan kolaboratif dengan aktor-aktor lain. Kemitraan lintas-pihak (cross-sector
partnership) dewasa ini telah menjadi tren pendekatan dan praktik TJSL, sebagaimana dipromosikan para ahli administrasi
publik. Aktor-aktor kunci yang potensial sebagai mitra perusahaan bisa berasal dari elemen pemerintah, dan masyarakat sipil
yang dalam hal ini organisasi non-pemerintah. Meski demikian, mendesain kemitraan yang efektif dan relevan bagi suatu konteks
dan dinamika politik ternyata merupakan tantangan tersendiri, khususnya bagi Negara seperti Indonesia sebagai kekuatan
ekonomi dan demokrasi baru. Sebagai upaya menjawab tantangan itu, artikel ini membahas karakteristik kunci kemitraan
lintas sektor yang efektif, yang dielaborasi dari dua studi kasus di Indonesia dan satu kasus di Tanzania. Ketiganya mewakili
model kemitraan dengan jangkauan lingkup dan kedalaman keterlibatan yang berbeda. Dalam tulisan ini, karakteristik kunci
dari kemitraan yang efektif ditelaah dan diperas dari pembahasan tiga studi kasus tersebut. Hasilnya adalah karakteristikkarakteristik kunci yang meliputi rasa kepemilikan, keterkaitan dan sinkronisasi, akuntabilitas, berkurangnya ketergantungan,
pembagian sumber daya, serta representasi dan legitimasi.
Kata kunci: kemitraan lintas pihak, pengurangan kemiskinan, tanggung jawab sosial dan lingkungan

INTRODUCTION
Many transnational corporations (TNCs) are based
in Indonesia and several gigantic TNCs, such as
ExxonMobil, Total, Chevron, ConocoPhillips, British
Petroleum, Newmont and Freeport each has an established
presence. As shown in Table 1, Indonesia ranks within
the top 20 for four important natural resources among
countries. Ross (2006) identifies Indonesia as the 23rd
oil dependent country, indicating the importance of oil
extraction as a substantial income for the country. In a
report for Oxfam America examining the relationship of
extractive industries and poverty across the globe, Ross
finds paradoxical facts.
On the one hand, TNCs make enormous profits
through the extraction of resources. Yet on the other
hand, they produce negative externalities that harm the
host countries in various social and environmental ways.
There have been chronic disastrous impacts in the form
of higher poverty rates, high rates of child malnutrition,

low spending levels on health care, low enrollment
rates in primary and secondary schools, low rates of
adult literacy, and income inequality. Moreover, oil and
mineral dependent countries tend to suffer from unusually
high rates of corruption, military spending, authoritarian
government, and government ineffectiveness, (Ross 2001,
p. 6-9). Indonesia, in many respects, is not an exception.
Table 1. Natural Resources in Indonesia
Type of Natural

World rank

Resources

Year

Coal

5th

2012

Gold

9

th

2011

Natural Gas

14th

2012

Oil

20th

2011

Source: International Energy Agency (2012) and the US Energy
Information Administration (2012).
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For more than three decades (1966-1998), with
privileges from the Soeharto regime, TNCs have been
involved in many incidents of environmental and human
rights abuse (Ballard, 2000), as well as corruption (Kemp,
2001). In addition, although Indonesia had liberalized
its extractive industries since 1967 in order to increase
revenues (Robinson, 1987) about 45 years later poverty
is still one of the country’s biggest issues. Time series
data from the Center for Welfare Studies shows persistent
figures: the number of Indonesians living in extreme
poverty was 40.36 million in 2008, 44.83 million in 2009,
and 43.07 million in 2010 (Handayani, 2012).
Oil and mining operations located in remote areas destroy
the local subsistence livelihoods and fail to accelerate the
local economy. Remote areas, as Wirisudarmo (2000)
describes, are typically impoverished because the terrain
is rocky, has high acidity, and/or consists of alluvial clay
and sandy material. These conditions force the local
people to make ends meet on the traditional extraction
of natural resources, such as crops, fish, forest products,
and industrial minerals such as gold (p. 26). To make
the condition even worse, Article 14 of Law Number 33
Year 2004 on Central-Regional Financial Balance rules
unfair distribution of revenues from extractive industries.
As shown in Table II, the central government has been
enjoying the majority of the profits from this sector, a
situation that makes it difficult for local governments to
accelerate development and reduce poverty rates.
Global CSR movements have raised optimism on the
role that business can play a role in tackling poverty (Fox,
2002; Fox & Prescott, 2004; Knoringga 2008, 2010),
as well as both avoiding and correcting social injuries
caused by corporations (Simmon at al., 1976 as quoted in
Idemudia, 2009). Although defining CSR hardly produce
commonly agreed consensus, there are three key features
of CSR (Nelson, 2004, p. 6).
“There are three key features, such as ; 1) beyond philanthropy
to more integrated approaches on the mainstream of business-for leading companies, CSR is moving from corporate
margins to the mainstream, to cover not only philanthropy,
but rather how a company manages the totality of its impact
on and contributions to society; 2) beyond public relations to
greater accountability and stakeholder engagement - CSR is
moving from assertions of corporate performance in one-way
communications to greater accountability and transparency
to more stakeholders through other forms of stakeholders
engagement that include, but go beyond public reporting; 3)
beyond legal compliance to greater clarity of principles and
values - leaders in CSR are moving beyond compliance based
mindset. They recognize that CSR is not only ‘box-ticking’,
but also about public statement of corporate purpose,

Table 2. Central Government and Local Government
Revenue Sharing
Items

Central
Government

Local Government

Mining

80%

20%

Oil

69,5%

30,5%

Natural Gas

84,5%

15,5%

Source: Office of National Development Planning (2008)
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principles, values, underpinned by internal policies system,
management, and accountability”

However, many scholars believe that the effectiveness
of CSR practices is impossible in an environment with
weak governance (Frynas, 2008). Calder and Culverwell
(2005) argue that weak governance has increased the
degree of involvement of corporations in human rights
abuses, bribery, and other fraudulent practices. Given their
bad track record in Indonesia, some believe the reliance
that TNCs have on voluntary CSR cannot guarantee
socially and environmentally responsible business
practices as it does in the US and Europe (Garvey &
Newell, 2005; Blowfield and Frynas, 2005).
The belief that mandatory CSR is more effective
than voluntary CSR was also the position taken by the
Government of Indonesia in 2007 when the House of
Representatives of Indonesia passed Law Number 40
(Law 40/2007) on Limited Liability Companies (Rosser,
Atje, & Edwin, 2008). The most controversial section,
Article 74, explicitly states that CSR is compulsory for
companies. Rosser and Edwin (2010) translated the four
points in Article 74 from the original Indonesian language
as follows.
“1) Limited liability companies that carry out business
activities in natural resource sectors or that are connected with
natural resources are obliged to implement Corporate Social
and Environmental Responsibility; 2) Corporate Social and
Environmental Responsibility, as referred to in paragraph (1)
represents a responsibility of a limited liability company that
is budgeted for and calculated as an expense of that company,
the implementation of which is to be carried out paying
attention to appropriateness and propriety; 3) Limited liability
companies that do not implement their obligation as referred
to in paragraph (1) will incur sanctions in accordance with
the provisions of legislative regulation; 4) Further provisions
concerning Corporate Social and Environmental Responsibility
will be laid down in a Government Regulation.”

Furthermore, the Indonesian government also believes that
mandatory requirement of CSR promises better coordination
and division of responsibilities among stakeholders. In many
occasions, as expressed by mayors, legislators and many other
public officials, the government expressed concerns over
potential overlap among different programs.
In contrast, an opposition group from the business
society, represented by the Indonesian House of Chambers,
business scholars, and politicians who are also engaged in
business, perceive this law with caution. Their ultimate
concern is that the law could encourage more corruption
and subsequently worsen the investment climate (Rosser
& Edwin, 2010). With its lobbying power, the business
group was able to stall the development of government
regulations for five years. By the time the Government
Regulation for Law 40/2007 was passed in June 2012, its
contents were unclear and did not specify guidance on how
to implement the mandatory CSR. This indecisive policy
framework leaves a void which can be widely interpreted
by predatory economic and political interests for corruption.
In addition, both Law 40/2007 and its implementing
regulations fail to respond to the growing expectation
for the establishment of CSR partnerships. In the
context in which companies and government have been
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involved in a closed relationship that excludes ordinary
citizens and societal groups, a multi-stakeholder and
cross-sector institutional arrangement has been preferable
for its advantages in terms of greater accountability and
inclusiveness (Nelson, 2004). Since Indonesia transitioned
into a democratic society in 1998, the public has been
demanding more inclusions through partnerships and
participatory avenues in almost every stage of policymaking and public affairs in general (Antlov, 2003).
In the absence of this regulatory framework to
facilitate cross-sector partnerships in CSR that aims to
effectively implement poverty reduction initiatives, this
paper observes and extracts key characteristics of effective
partnerships based on three case studies of which a model
for each is described. In particular, characteristics utilized
for assessing the effectiveness of the models include:
ownership, alignment and synchronization, accountability,
reduced dependency, resource sharing, representation, and
legitimacy.
The author starts the discussion by presenting the
literatures on partnerships from different scholars and
disciplines. This is followed by descriptions of the cases
studies, encompassing the backgrounds, objectives,
processes of partnership formation, roles of facilitators,
areas of partnerships, and the outcomes. Before arriving
at critical consideration on each model derived from the
case studies, the author presents comparisons and analysis
based on the framework. The final part is conclusion that
provides recommendations.
RESEARCH METHODS
The author used desk research as a method to identify
tool of analysis and to study three different cases of CSR
partnerships. The author reviewed books, research reports,
and journals in several range of disciplines including
business, development studies, governance, and policy
studies. When selecting scholarly resources, the author
utilized key words mainly cross-sector partnerships,
collaborative governance, and tri-sector partnerships.
Most studies reviewed are about theories and concepts of
partnerships, and initiatives to implement partnerships in
which government, NGOs and corporations are involved
in. The cases are both in advanced democracies like the
US and developing worlds such as in Asia and Africa. In
addition, the author followed up on the literature cited in the
literatures that reviewed.
The result of the review is a framework to analyze the
three models used as case studies in this paper. Three case
studies in Indonesia and Tanzania were selected as the objects
of analysis because they represent initiatives that differ in the
intent, scope and depth of collaboration, as well as the context
of partnerships. The author perceives the case studies as
continuum from “minimalist” to “maximalist” collaboration.
RESULT AND DISCUSSION
The first discussion is about Understanding the
Framework of Cross-sector Partnerships. Many scholars
in the field of cross-sector partnership identify the concept
differently. Some refer to it as collaborative governance
(Anshell & Gash, 2007), cross-sector collaboration (Bryson,
Crosby, & Stone, 2006), cross-sector partnership (Seitanaidi
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& Crane, 2009; Googins & Rochlin, 2000; Selsky & Parker,
2001), tri-sector partnership (Warner & Sullivan, 2007),
and social alliances (Waddock, 1988; Berger, Cunningham
& Drumwrigth, 2004). This paper uses these different
terminologies interchangeably to discuss poverty reduction
initiatives that are carried out through collaborations among
corporations, government (host countries and donors),
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), community-based
organizations (CBOs), and communities.
This concept is utilized because it offers greater
engagement compared to the coalition model or the publicprivate partnerships (PPPs) model. A coalition, especially
in regard to relationships among stakeholders in extractive
industries, is impermanent, means-oriented, and diverse
in goals, with little shared use of resources and value of
agreement (Gamson, 1961). A coalition may generate more
risks and disadvantages than it would benefits. Meanwhile,
public-private partnerships (PPPs), as Ansell and Gash
(2007) argue, are “often to achieve coordination rather than
to achieve decision-making consensus per se” (p. 548). They
assert that collective decision-making is secondary in PPPs
because the focus is to make an agreement to deliver certain
services or perform certain tasks.
The list below is a summary of characteristics of effective
cross-sector collaborations (Waddock, 1988; Googins &
Rochlin, 2000; Berger, Cunningham & Drumwrigth, 2004;
Bryson & Cosby, 2006; Warner, et. al., 2007; Anshell &
Gash, 2007; Seitanaidi & Crane, 2009; Selsky and Parker,
2010; Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2011). Effective crosssector collaborations have the following characteristics, as
summarized in Table 3.
Several other dimensions are also critical to the success of
partnerships. “Ownership”, Ansell and Gash (2007) argue,
“implies shared responsibility for the process” (p. 560). In
this respect, they assert that trust is critical so that stakeholders
have a willingness to involve in such partnership initiative.
According The New Broker: Brokering Partnerships
for Development (Warner, 2003), partnerships initiatives
may be facilitated by independent mediators. This is due to
stakeholders with differing interests are hardly capable to
achieve foundational aspects of partnerships such as goals
and resource sharing. Nonetheless, it is the government
agency that is ultimately held responsible for the outcomes
of partnerships. The role of private sector in poverty
reduction agenda through its CSR should be regarded
as complementary and supplementary to government’s
function (Young, 2006).
Table 3 Characteristics of Effective Cross-Sector
Partnership
a.

common goals;

f.

non-hierarchical and equal
structures and processes;

b.

collective and consensus-based
decision making;

g.

trust-based;

c.

one sector cannot solve the
problems alone;

h.

relationships are institutionalized for-mally and informally;

d.

solutions created together benefit
all stakeholders;

j.

synergistic interactions among
partners;

e.

shared and pooled resources

j.

shared accountability for

(such as funds, expertise,
competence);

outcomes and results.

EDI, CROSS-SECTOR PARTNERSHIPS MODELS

In addition to ownership, Helm and Loon (2003)
emphasize alignment and synchronization. Alignment means
that recipient’s systems to design and implement programs,
financial management, and monitoring and evaluation are
utilized. When the system works less effectively, partnership
initiatives work to improve the system. On the other hand,
synchronization implies that stakeholders work on reducing
fragmentation, duplication, and overlapping programs. As a
result, synchronization increases complementarities and makes
full use of stakeholders’ respective comparative advantages.
Both proper expectation and dependency management
in cross-sector partnerships also play an essential role.
Davy (2004) pointed out that merely building infrastructure
or delivering social services without involving local
stakeholders has led to a dependency culture. The consequence
of this dependency culture, says Idemudia (2008), is an
escalation in community expectations. Hence, Hamman
(2001) states that when participation that is accompanied
by capacity building efforts increases, local stakeholders are
less dependent on the extractive companies.
To all these prescriptions, Ansell and Gash (2007) assert
the importance of legitimacy and representation with regard
to inclusiveness. The more inclusive a partnership, the more
stakeholders are represented. As a consequence, legitimacy
increases since the policy outcome represents a broad-based
consensus (Ansell and Gash, 2007, p. 555-556).
The further result of increased inclusion and representation
is accountability. The more inclusion of diverse stakeholders in
decision-making processes affecting the course of partnerships,
the more possibilities are available for local stakeholders-mainly local communities--to have a say and to exert control
(Garvey and Newell, 2005).
The second discussion is about models identified from
case studies. The three models below represent crosssector collaborations with differing scope and depth. The
first model, derived from Soplop et.al’s (2009) study in
Indonesia, is basically a partnership in implementation. It is
unique because the targeted communities have the capacity
to influence the decision-making processes on the ground
based on the predetermined design by the government,
corporations, and the international NGO. The second
model, based on Sullivan and Kiangai’s (2004) research in
Tanzania, represents other characteristics. It is companyled yet stakeholders are able to influence the subsequent
policy making and implementation. The final model, based
on Suryani’s (2010) finding in Indonesia, represents a more
holistic collaboration where all stakeholders have been
involved throughout all phases of the partnership cycles.
Community-based School Reconstruction: Indonesia,
responding to the destroyed schools from the 2006 earthquake
in Yogyakarta and Central Java, Indonesia, Research Triangle
Institute (RTI), a USAID-funded projects’ contractor,
initiated public-private partnerships (PPPs) for school
reconstruction. This approach was meant to link central
government, local governments, communities, and
companies (ConocoPhillips, a US oil company operating in
Indonesia) to run a community-based school reconstruction.
They did this through expanding on an existing project
called the Decentralized Basic Education program (DBE1),
that assists local governments to improve their financial
management systems and service delivery in education.
Parties involved in DBE1 worked together based on
letters of commitment (LC) identifying and clarifying
the respective roles and contributions from each partner,
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which became binding agreements. The LC was to be
exchanged among the stakeholders to be a reference for
inter-party monitoring. Badan Pelaksana Kegiatan Usaha
Hulu Minyak dan Gas Bumi (BP Migas), the government’s
executive agency that regulates upstream oil and gas
business activity, coordinated with the oil companies to
channel some of their CSR funds into the program. The
education departments at the provincial and district level,
together with local Government’s religious affairs offices
selected the schools that would be reconstructed. The
local Governments solved land title issues and offered
staff support, office space, school equipment, furniture,
and materials. Communities, through school boards, were
actively involved in designing, planning and constructing
the buildings which included employment opportunities for
local residents.
A committee was formed to manage the project, consisting
of 9-15 volunteers representing the communities surrounding
the schools. Volunteers from the school board were selected
based on their prior experiences in building management
and supervision rather than on their social status. The DBE1
facilitated trainings and workshops for these community
committees to enable them to work independently and selfsufficiently. Topics covered in the trainings and workshops
included building design, procurement, hiring, volunteer
management, construction process oversight, financial
and administrative reporting, effective collaboration and
management of the overall construction processes.
Soplop et.al.’s (2009) study concluded that the community
participation approach used by DBE1 answered the
weaknesses of the existing model of school construction
which was usually transferred to the building contractors or
other third parties. Contractors tend to be profit oriented and
give less attention to building durability and maintenance.
Their building model most often did not fit local needs.
Meanwhile, DBE1 produces higher quality construction
work, lower costs, and greater transparency. It also cultivates
a higher degree of community ownership and satisfaction
when compared with reconstruction work undertaken by
the traditional practices of private contractors (Soplop et.al.,
2009, p. 10).
Social Development Program: Tanzania, Kahana Mining
Corporation Ltd (KMCL), a subsidiary of Barrick Gold, was
granted a license to operate in Bulyanhulu, Tanzania, in
1994. Bulyanhulu is about 45 km south of Lake Victoria in
the Kahana District in North Central Tanzania. Prior to this
arrangement, from the 1970s the mine site was inhabited
by 30,000–40,000 artisan miners. The granting of a license
to KMCL by the national government lead to government
promoted violent actions against them starting in April
1996, including torture and murder. These incidents sparked
an international uproar.
Local communities saw the discrepancies between their
lives and the multi-billion dollar corporation. The central
government failed to distribute mining revenues to improve
the local community’s welfare. Realizing that this could
damage the company’s reputation, KMCL eventually
chose to apply a tri-sector partnership approach to gain the
community’s acceptance for them to operate in the area.
A safe workplace environment is also important to attract
local Tanzanian as prospective managers. One action to
achieve community acceptance was KMCL’s plan to
replace 70% of its expatriate managers within five years,
with local Tanzanians.
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KMCL’s tri-sector partnership approach was
implemented through a program called the Social
Development Program (SDP). In 2000, KMCL contracted
a Canadian consulting company, Planning Alliance, to
facilitate the partnership processes. The SDP consisted
of housing and other related infrastructures for KMCL’s
workers. It was extended to reach the local community,
in terms of health, education, water supply and local
business development. Given the project’s large scope,
KMCL pooled resources from local government and
communities, and prepared an exit strategy before handing
over the long-term responsibility to the community and
local governments.
A community development unit was set up internally
in KMCL to implement the development plan in
collaboration with the community, local governments,
and NGOs, and to coordinate implementation across its
internal units. Extensive consultations and negotiations
were undertaken to enable KMCL management and
the various stakeholders to identify areas to address. A
cross-sector committee was established to coordinate the
program design and resources in each project.
Each actor, in any given partnership, played a role
based on its respective scopes. The NGO CARE Tanzania
produced training modules, trained and mentored
teachers, and mobilized the community. The District
Council recruited teachers, supervised schools, created
provision of construction materials and logistical support
for the program. Village government and communities
contributed labor and land for construction, explored
communities’ financial contribution for the program, and
mobilized people to participate in adult education.
As a result, as Sullivan and Kiangi’s (2004) study
reveals, SDP has increased children’s access to education
to closely 100 percent compared to 60-80 percent prior
to the program. About 35,000 people enjoy better access
to clean water (p. 122). The communities have adopted
healthier life styles and have become more aware of HIV,
AIDS, and malaria (p. 123). Due to the partnership model
and contribution by SDP, the government was able to
better implement its development programs (p. 124-125).
Multistakeholders Forum: Indonesia, Kutai Timur
District is located in Borneo, Indonesia. It hosts
approximately sixty mining companies, mainly coal,
the revenues of which contribute 84.47% to the overall
economy of the area. Because the district is a hinterland
with limited public infrastructure and services, the local
government expects companies to be involved in efforts
to boost local development through PPPs. In addition,
working together in a partnership is idealized in order to
avoid duplication among companies’ CSR programs and
the government development programs.
In 2005, a local NGO, called the Centre for
Empowerment and Economics (C-Force), initiated
a program entitled “Multi-stakeholders Partnership
Initiative for Implementing Sustainable CSR in Kutai
Timur” with funding from the European Union. The
Multi-stakeholders Forum (MSH-Forum) was intended
to facilitate partnerships in designing, implementing,
monitoring and evaluating CSR programs. The
other objectives of MSH-Forum included promoting
participatory, transparent, accountable and pro-poor CSR
practices.
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For these purposes, C-Force invited companies, local
government officials, local members of legislatures,
community figures, local NGOs, and local universities to
participate. It also organized all of the activities starting
from the formation of the partnership’s committee,
programs, and Memorandum of Understanding (MoU).
The multi-stakeholders agreed that MSH’s mission was
to mainstream the UN’s Millennium Development Goals
for CSR practices in areas of health, education, economic
development, and infrastructure, which were in line
with the Kutai District Development’s plan. C-Force’s
facilitation also succeeded in binding the partnership
with District Leader’s Regulation Number 10/02.188.3/
HK/VII/2006 which outlines the “Guidance of CSR
Implementation in Kutai Timur District”.
The governance body of the MSH Forum represents
companies, local government, and civil society entities
equally. There are three layers in the committee: district
level, sub-district coordinating committee, and village
coordinating committee. At the district level, there is an
advisory and implementation board consisting of district
leaders, CEOs, and other top ranking officials in local
government and companies. MSH-Forum Secretariat
acts as the head of the Implementation Board for day-today administration. At the sub-district and village level,
the coordinating committees representing MSH-Forum
worked to identify and list problems, aspirations, and
needs through annual development planning meetings.
Funding, as outlined by the guidance policy or rules,
comes from companies, government, and unrestricted
donations.
The planning process starts from participatory annual
development meetings at the village level, and then moves
up to the sub-district, followed by the district level. The
Coordinating Teams of MSH Forum at the sub-district
and the village level act as the facilitators of the planning
processes. However, the community can also submit
their proposals directly to the Committee of MSH-Forum
without attending the meeting. Discussions about CSR
program formulation, evaluation of CSR implementation,
as well as the performance measurements of the
partnership forum, were held once a year.
Suryani (2010) found that MSH-Forum achieved
several outcomes. Companies’ CSR programs and local
government programs have been better coordinated
and synchronized. Several government-company joint
programs were also created. Through MSH-Forum,
the local government and companies better managed
community expectations. On the other hand, MSH-Forum
provided more access for communities to present their
needs and have their voices heard to make CSR programs
more relevant.
The third discussion is about the Analysis of Case
Studies’ Advantages and Disadvantages. The three models
from the case studies can be regarded as a collaboration
continuum, as illustrated in Table II. From left to right,
the degree of partnership is more comprehensive. The
processes through which partnerships were formulated,
worked towards their missions and programs, as well as
achieved their goals, were more intensive from left to
right.
A number of characteristics were utilized to assess the
advantages and disadvantages of each model. For a crosssector collaboration model to be effective in facilitating multi-
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stakeholders poverty reduction initiatives, it should have these
relevant characteristics: 1) the ability to encourage a sense of
ownership; 2) program alignment and synchronization; 3) the
legitimacy by securing inclusiveness and representation; 4)
resource sharing; 5) reducing dependency; 6) expectation and
conflict management; 7) accountability.

Expectation

It can be said that

The stakeholders were

The deliberative

management and

DBE1 simply chan-

actively involved in the

processes pro-

dependency

neled the project to

processes of consulta-

vided avenues

areas where the need

tion, negotiation and

for companies

was greatest. For a

bottom up planning.

to explain their

regular situation, this

In the processes,

limitations. The

method can increase

KMCL encouraged

facilitator can

dependency because

communities to utilize

build sense of

the resource sharing is

their assets. The Kahana

empowerment by

imbalanced

District Government

identifying tangi-

shared 25% of its

ble and intangible

budget, though it was

underutilized

only 2% of the total

assets owned by

SDP budget plan.

government and

Table 4 Comparison of Models
Characteristics

Ownership

DBE1 Indonesia

SDP Tanzania

MSH-Forum In-

Com-munity

Company-Led Scheme

donesia Bottom-

Participation within

with Consul-tations &

up Partnership

Top-down Model

Negotiations

The program was ini-

SDP was indeed a com-

The goals,

tiated by external ac-

pany-led program, but

rules, project

tors and driven by the

there were also many

areas, targeted

central gov-ernment.

in-depth consulta-

benefi-ciaries,

Local govern-ments

tions and negotiations

roles division and

might have less sense

between the company

shared resources

of ownership than the

and stakehold-ers in

were agreed by

communities targeted.

each committee of each

consen-sus. The

In contrast, communi-

project area. Since the

other key is that

ties had undertaken

priorities represent the

it was formalized

strong leadership in

consensus, the owner-

by the Head of

the project implemen-

ship is greater.

District Decree.

tation.
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communities.
KMCL provided technical skills, funding, and

Project proposed

capacity building to

and agreed in

local government and

MSH-Forum

communities.

reflect not only
services but also
capacity building.
Local government
shared its human
resources for

The partnership

implementing

then became a

the projects that

public program.

the MSH-Forum
funded.

Alignment and

Provincial, district

In the consultation and

Since the very

syn-chronization

educa-tion offices and

negotiation phases,

begin-ning MSH-

For running the

religious affairs of-

KMCL identified its

Forum's goals

MSH-Forum

fices helped DBE1 se-

sup-plementary and

and programs

Secretariat,

lect school recipi-ents

comple-mentary roles.

were formulated

companies shared

of the reconstruction

KMCL supported the

in line with the

the funds

project. The project

government and com-

government

com-plemented the

munities in ca-pacity

development plan.

areas that were not

building.

covered by gov-

Representation and

A community par-

The relevant stakehold-

MSH Forum

legitimacy

ticipa-tion approach,

ers including the

encompasses

representa-tion, and

company, government

all stakeholders

legitimacy were built

entities, mining workers

including those

at community level,

and community mem-

who had conflict-

i.e. by electing the

bers actively involved

ing relationships.

com-mittees’ members

in consultation and

Moreover, chair-

negotiations.

ing the Forum

ernment programs or
oth-er nonprofit relief
pro-grams.

Accountability

DBE1 managed

Despite the asym-

Accountability in

so that they can have

the overall project

metrical resources

MSH Forum is

real power to face the

are executive of-

management, yet in

among stakeholders

greater than the

existing domi-nant vil-

ficials from each

implementing the

and the project’s nature

previous models.

lage elites. The overall

stakeholder. This

project, the team

which was company-

MSH Forum has

project’s legitima-cy

creates a strong

consisted of DBE1, BP

led, each stakeholder

annual meetings

relied on the central

legitimacy.

Migas and companies

had somewhat equal

to evaluate its

government’s author-

representatives. On

power to hold each

projects. “Checks

ity. This is not ideal as

the contrary, provin-

other accountable. The

and balances”

a model for extractive

cial and local govern-

company has financial

existed along

in-dustries.

ment officials could

and expertise power.

the project’s

not stand equally with

The mine workers and

life. Monitoring

this DBE1-BP Migas-

residents could poten-

and evaluation

Companies’ team.

tially deploy blockages

involved stake-

or sabotages that would

holders’ repre-

At the community

harm the company’s

sentatives where

level, accountability

reputation and produc-

they could give

was well established.

tion. The government

input to improve

Participatory govern-

has authority and other

the project

ance conducted by

legal instruments.

school committees
succeeded in preventing any corruption or
other malpractices.

Timeline

Partnering processes

Partnering processes

Partnering pro-

took a year from

took a year from 2000

cesses took place

Octo-ber 2007through

through 2001.

from Au-gust 31,

Sep-tember 2008.

2005 through
March 27, 2006.

In addition to the comparison in Table II, there are
some possible risks and some further disadvantages in
establishing a collaborative across sectors. The DBE1 model
is unlikely to be preferred by the local government and
communities surrounding companies in Indonesia because of
its limited access to program design and planning. Greater
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access to policymaking is preferred over mere involvement
in implementation. This relates to a psychological issue
that TNCs are foreign powers and as a response, local
governmental and societal entities should seize the power
through all possible channels.
If the DBE1 model is applied in the areas of extractive
industries, and included in the second or the third model,
possible opponents of this model could be local government’s
officials and politicians. In the age of decentralization, when
local governments in Indonesia have been enjoying greater
autonomy since 2001, it is unlikely that they will support
this model. The DBE1 model positioned local government
out of the project’s implementation. That position eliminates
opportunities for local officials to corrupt the project. By the
same token, DBE1 model also eliminates opportunities for
contractors to win a development contract bidding with low
quality of project proposals. Within what had been a common
modus operandi through which corrupt officials enjoy bribery
from contractors who wanted to win the bidding, local
contractors and corrupt officials are solidly disadvantaged by
the DBE1 model.
Local governments are likely to support the SDP model.
In Indonesia, seventy percent of local government budgets
are generally spent on salaries (Synnerstrom, 2007). Hence
a model in which companies provide the bulk of partnership
funding is preferable. A capacity building component is also
desired given the fact that many local officials in remote areas
lack capacities in terms of project management knowledge
and skills (Sullivan & Kiangi, 2007). Local governments seem
to benefit if companies take over the project management for
similar reasons. Nevertheless, a sentiment that local entities
should own and control resources, even though these have
been legally contracted to TNCs by the central government,
can create a problem. Therefore, this scheme is preferable
as a temporary option, such as in the case of a transitional
institutional arrangement. It implies that in the long-term,
after local governments, local NGOs and communities would
have their capacities increased, allowing to withdraw from
their initial leading roles.
In a conflict-prone context where trust is scarce, like in
the SDP and MSH-Forum, the roles of facilitators were
proven crucial in bridging differing interests and actors.
Many scholars find that facilitators can mediate gaps, prevent
domination, and condition a conducive environment for
partnerships (Waddock, 1988; Warner, 2003; Fox, 2005;
Bryson, Crosby & Stone, 2006; Ansell & Gash, 2007), even
in the absence of legislation that can foster collaboration
(Ashman, 2001). To do so, Lasker and Weiss (2001) assert
that facilitators must have skills to “(1) promote broad and
active participation, (2) ensure broad based influence and
control, (3) facilitate productive group dynamics, and (4)
extend the scope of the process” (Ansell & Gash, 2007, p.
554). Donor agencies, NGOs, consulting firms, universities
and other actors can fulfill the role of facilitators.
In the MSH-Forum, there is a risk of domination with
regard to the existing imbalance of power relationships
between elites and communities. Elites in government,
legislative, and political parties generally have more power
and influence due to the patron-client culture in local politics.
A conflict of interest with government officials also needs
to be considered since they act as partners and regulators
simultaneously. Responding to this potential risk, companies
may react in the way of hesitation and passiveness in the
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MSH-Forum. This negative consequence is indeed revealed
in Suryani’s (2010) study, showing that MSH-Forum had
become a battle ground among local elites during the election
seasons. Another possible explanation for this is C-Force’s
inability to sustain facilitation due to limited project funding
from the European Union.
CONCLUSION
Given the fact that one model cannot fit every context,
this paper is not proposing a single approach. Rather, after
evaluating the weaknesses, advantages, risks and lessons
learned from the three models, the paper arrives at a number
of propositions for consideration.
First, neutral, professional and credible facilitators should
exist in CSR cross-sector partnership development initiatives
to bridge asymmetrical power, resources and knowledge
among stakeholders (Ward, Fox, & Wilson, 2007). Second,
donor agencies should provide capacity development for
companies so that they can effectively engage in governance
reform initiatives relative to CSR. Third, in order to have a
high degree of representation, legitimacy, accountability,
program ownership, alignment and synchronization, CSR
cross-sector partnership initiatives should have a governance
body and structure that encompasses almost all sectors and
levels. Fourth, CSR projects with low complexity or ones
that fit with a community’s capacity, is likely to produce
the highest output and outcomes if implemented through
community participation.
Designing effective cross-sector partnerships that are
relevant to Indonesia’s dynamics and political contexts is
indeed difficult. Nevertheless, combinations of those key
characteristics of effective partnership in the three models,
as presented in the paper, can be alternative approaches to
successfully align CSR with the poverty reduction agenda in
Indonesia.
.
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